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 1 Introduction
Little is known about the interrelation between risk bundling, the structure of the risk
retention, and alternative risk management objectives that may be important for ﬁrms. This
paper provides new insights into this issue. The optimal structure of risk transfer depends on
the interrelation between the risk management motive and the cost of risk management. For
two reasons, the interrelation is particularly important for ﬁrms. First, diﬀerent ﬁrms may
focus on diﬀerent risk management objectives. Second, ﬁrms are in principle quite ﬂexible
to use innovative risk transfer instruments.
Much of the insurance literature focuses on risk aversion as the motive for risk transfer,
and premium loading, moral hazard, and adverse selection as reasons for why full insurance
coverage may not be optimal. An important result in the insurance literature is that, with
proportional loading, an insurance contract with a common deductible for aggregate losses
is optimal for risk averse policyholders (Arrow, 1963; Raviv, 1979; Gollier and Schlesinger,
1995). No such robust result can be obtained in the case of risk aversion and moral hazard
or adverse selection. Holmstrom (1979) shows that under certain conditions a deductible
contract on a singe risk can be optimal with moral hazard. However, a standard deductible
contract is generally not optimal for risk averse policyholders in the presence of moral hazard.
Am a i nr e a s o nf o rw h yﬁrms engage in risk management, as discussed in the literature,
are deadweight costs of raising and holding capital. Froot et al. (1993) show that convex
costs of raising capital to cover losses ex post can induce a ﬁr mt oa c ta si fi tw e r er i s k
averse. However, raising capital ex post is only one way to deal with risk. Because of
regulation, bankruptcy costs, and adverse eﬀects of a debt overhang problem, a ﬁrm may ex
ante choose a level of equity that is suﬃciently high to cover potential losses. Accommodating
losses by increasing the ﬁrm’s equity also involves a cost because of tax disadvantages and
information and incentive problems. Reducing the required ex ante equity to accommodate
losses is another important risk transfer motive for corporations (e.g., Merton, 2005).
In this paper I focus on the cost of accommodating risk as the risk management motive.
The ﬁrm faces two independent risks, which may result in a loss or not. Investment in loss
2control reduces the loss probability for each risk, but is unobservable by outsiders. The
resulting moral hazard problem is the reason for why the ﬁrm may retain some risk. I show
that an insurance policy that jointly covers both risks and involves a common aggregate
deductible minimizes the required ex ante capital to cover the retained losses subject to the
ﬁrm’s incentive constraints. Thus, a joint deductible is optimal even in the case of moral
hazard if the ﬁrm’s risk management objective is to reduce the cost of accommodating losses.
The recent years have witnessed an increasing development of new contracts, instru-
ments, and solutions to transfer risk. A common characteristic of some of these instruments
is that they bundle risk exposures. For example, multiline insurance or umbrella policies
bundle diﬀerent risk exposures to be covered by one insurance contract with a common ag-
gregate deductible and policy limit. The ﬁrst contracts of this type combined property and
casualty risks, but more and more multiline products have been developed. The virtue of
multiline insurance is much debated. To address this issue, we have to better understand
how the products should be designed and how the design relates to the risk management
objective and the cost of risk transfer. The present paper provides a further step towards
this understanding.
This paper is related to the work by Fluet and Pannequin (1997) and Breuer (2005). They
analyze the optimal insurance structure with multiple risks in the case of adverse selection
and moral hazard respectively. In their work the motive for risk management stems from risk
aversion. Although a comprehensive contract that takes into account all risks is optimal, the
optimal contract does not resemble a contract with a joint deductible on aggregate losses. In
a setting similar to that analyzed by Breuer (2005), I show that a joint deductible is optimal
if the risk management objective is to accommodate losses by holding costly equity.
As a reference case I also analyze the case of proportional loading if the ﬁrm’s objective is
to accommodate losses. The ﬁnding that a joint deductible is optimal in this case resembles
the work by Shimpi (2001), Harrington et al. (2002), and Meulbroek (2002). Laux (2001)
shows that it can be optimal to combine projects to be managed by one manager in the
presence of moral hazard. In this work the manager is risk neutral and protected by limited
3liability. The objective is to minimize the expected wage payment subject to the manager’s
incentive constraints.
There is a large literature that discusses the beneﬁts of pooling and tranching of risks
in banking and securitization. A main beneﬁt of risk pooling is that is allows to carve
out less risky claims, which is beneﬁcial if verifying the losses (payoﬀs) is costly or if there
is asymmetric information between market participants (e.g., Diamond, 1984; Gorton and
Pennacchi, 1990; DeMarzo, 2005). In the current paper the focus is on moral hazard and
the beneﬁt of pooling risks is that it allows a more even retention in diﬀerent loss states,
which reduces the required level of equity to cover the retained losses. Nicolò and Pelizzon
(2008) consider a similar setting to analyze the optimal structure of credit derivatives and
the optimality of bundling credit risk. Their focus is on the role of regulation and opaque
markets.
In the next section I introduce the setting. In Section 3 I discuss the role of bundling to
reduce transaction costs when insurance contracts are associated with loading. In Section 4
I analyze the optimal retention structure and the role of bundling in the presence of moral
hazard problems. I conclude in Section 5. All proofs are in the appendix.
2 The Setting
A ﬁrm has two identical and uncorrelated risks. For example, a ﬁrm may have two production
plants, which may be destroyed by a ﬁre. Each risk can result in a loss x with probability
p ∈ (0,1).I f t h e ﬁrm invests c in loss control, this risk’s loss probability is pl, without
investment in loss control, the loss probability is ph >p l.T h eﬁrm’s total loss is given by
L ∈ {2x,x,0}, with Pr(2x)=pipj, Pr(x)=pi(1−pj)+pj(1−pi),a n dPr(0) = (1−pi)(1−pj),
where pi,p j ∈ {ph,p l} are determined by the ﬁrm’s investment in loss prevention for each
risk. Investment in loss prevention is eﬃcient, but unobservable.
The ﬁrm is risk neutral. However, because of frictional costs of retaining and transferring
risks and potential incentive problems, the ﬁrm faces a non-trivial problem when deciding
4how to deal with risks. One alternative is to obtain insurance coverage.
Insurance coverage. I nt h ec a s eo faﬁre in a production plant, the ﬁrm may insure each
plant separately. Alternatively, the ﬁrm can obtain a multiline or umbrella policy for both
plants or transfer the risks to a captive insurance company that reinsures the aggregate risk
using a stop-loss policy. Thus, the ﬁrm can choose between separate or joint insurance.
Let IL ∈ {I2,I 1} be the total amount that the ﬁrm receives from an insurer in the case
of a loss of size 2x and x, respectively. Given insurance coverage IL,t h eﬁrm’s retention is
RL = L−IL if a loss of size L occurs. I follow the insurance literature in assuming that the
i n s u r a n c ec o v e r a g ea n dt h er e t e n t i o na r en o n - n e g a t i v ea n dn o n d e c r e a s i n gs ot h a tt h eﬁrm
has no incentives to hide or fraudulently cause losses. In the current setting, the assumption
implies that 0 ≤ I1 and 0 ≤ ∆I ≤ ∆L.
The premium for insurance coverage is given by P =( 1+α)E[IL] where α ≥ 0 is a
proportional loading factor. Premium loading can be one reason for the ﬁrm to decide to
retain some of the risk. Moreover, if the ﬁrm fully insures both risks, it has no incentives to
invest in reducing the loss probabilities. Insurers anticipate the negative incentives and the
ﬁrm must bear the consequences in the form of a higher premium for the insurance policy.
To retain incentives to invest in loss control, the ﬁrm has to participate in the loss.
However, retaining risk is also costly as the ﬁrm either has to raise capital ex post
to ﬁnance the losses that are not covered by insurance or it has to increase its equity to
accommodate the uninsured losses. I focus on the objective of accommodating losses and
derive the structure of the insurance contract that minimizes the cost of accommodation
subject to the ﬁrm retaining incentives to invest in loss control. Deriving the level of required
capital that is necessary to retain incentives to invest in loss control is an important step in
the ﬁrm’s overall risk management decision. If the cost of holding the necessary equity is
too high, the ﬁrm might ﬁnd it optimal to transfer the total risk despite the moral hazard
conﬂict.
5Accommodating the loss. The ﬁrm can accommodate losses by increasing its equity.
Indeed, as in the case of a bank, the ﬁr mm a yb er e q u i r e db yr e g u l a t i o nt oh o l de q u i t y
to cover potential losses. Moreover, holding equity may be preferred to uncovered losses
because of a potential debt overhang problem after large uncovered losses. Holding equity
involves deadweight costs because of a tax disadvantage of equity and adverse selection or
information problems. The level of required equity increases in the sum of the insurance
premium P and the maximum loss that the ﬁrm retains, which is given by R2 since the
retention is nondecreasing. Thus, the frictional cost of equity is an increasing function of
P + R2,w h i c hId e ﬁne as γ(P + R2). For ease of exposition, I ignore other factors that
determine the required equity and assume that γ(y) > 0 and γ0(y) > 0 for y ≡ P + R2 > 0
and that γ(0) = 0.T h eﬁrm’s objective is to minimize the total (frictional) cost of risk:
min
R1,R2
αE[L − RL]+γ(P + R2), (1)
with P =( 1+α)E[L − RL].
3R e d u c i n g T r a n s a c t i o n C o s t s
As a benchmark case, I assume that there is no moral hazard problem and that the cost of
accommodating losses is convex. That is, the ﬁrm can commit to the optimal level of loss
control and γ00(y) > 0. With proportional loading and risk averse individuals, the optimal
insurance contract is a policy with a common deductible for aggregate losses (Arrow, 1963;
Raviv, 1979; Gollier and Schlesinger 1995). In the following I show that a common deductible
for aggregate losses is also optimal if the ﬁrm’s objective is to minimize the transaction costs
of risk transfer stemming from loading and the cost of accommodating losses. (See also
Shimpi, 2001, Harrington et al., 2002, and Meulbroek, 2002.)
With separate insurance, each contract speciﬁes a level of retention for the underlying
risk. Because of symmetry, the same retention RS is chosen for each risk so that R1 = RS
and R2 =2 RS. Thus, with separate insurance, the choice of R1 determines R2.
6I ft h et w or i s k sa r ej o i n t l yi n s u r e d ,R2 and R1 can be chosen individually to minimize
the total cost of risk.
Proposition 1 (i) It is optimal to choose a contract with a joint deductible on aggregate
losses. (ii) The optimal joint deductible, DJ, is higher than the total retention with separate
insurance if DJ <x .
The optimization problem (1) implies that R1 =m i n {R2,x}. Assume that R1 <
min{R2,x} instead, then P decreases if R1 is increased to R1 =m i n {R2,x}; thereby, the ﬁrm
reduces the loading as well as the frictional cost of equity. The optimal retention structure
can be implemented through an insurance contract that jointly covers both losses with a
joint deductible DJ so that R2 = DJ and R1 =m i n {x,DJ}.
An insurance contract that jointly covers both losses and has a deductible on the ag-
gregate loss reduces the total costs of risk in the presence of loading and frictional costs of
accommodation. The advantage of bundling risks in one contract is to overcome the con-
straint R2 =2 R1 with separate insurance. This allows for a more eﬃcient use of the capital
held to bear losses. If the ﬁrm has to hold suﬃcient capital to cover losses up to 2RS,t h e r e
is excess capacity to bear losses if only one loss occurs in the case of separate insurance, as in
this case the ﬁrm only bears RS. Thus, when there is (exactly) one loss, the ﬁrm retains less
risk than it is able and willing to accommodate: the ﬁrm is overinsured in the sense that it
buys more insurance coverage than is optimal. Increasing the retention in the one-loss case,
i.e., increasing R1 while holding R2 ﬁxed, reduces the expected indemnity payment, and
therefore the loading associated with insurance and the frictional costs of accommodating
losses.
The ﬁrm trades oﬀ the frictional cost of accommodation and premium loading when
choosing the level of total retention. For a given level of capital, the marginal cost of
capital is identical under joint and separate insurance. However, joint insurance uses capital
more eﬃciently (in the one loss case) and reduces the insurance premium, which reduces the
marginal cost of accommodation for a given maximum total retention. Moreover, an increase
7i nt h et o t a ld e d u c t i b l eb yo n eu n i ta l w a y sr e d u c e st h ei n s u r a n c ec o v e r a g eb yo n eu n i ti nt h e
two-loss state. The eﬀect of an increase in the total retention by one unit in the one loss
state diﬀers: with joint insurance, the insurance coverage in the one-loss state decreases by
one unit if DJ <x , but it has no eﬀect if DJ >x ; with separate insurance, the insurance
coverage in the one loss state decreases by one half (if the retention is equally split between
both contracts).
If the cost of accommodation is high or if the premium loading of insurance coverage is
low, the ﬁrm will choose a low deductible and DJ <x .With joint insurance, each unit of
capital held can be used to reduce the insurance coverage for every possible loss state. In this
case, a higher deductible is optimal than under separate insurance. In contrast, if the cost of
accommodation is low or if the premium loading is high, the deductible DJ may exceed x. In
this case, there are two eﬀects that may result in a total deductible that is higher or lower for
joint insurance than for separate insurance. First, with joint insurance, reducing the total
deductible reduces only the insurance coverage when both losses are realized, but not in the
one-loss case (as with separate insurance). Therefore, reducing the total deductible has a
lower eﬀect on the total insurance premium. For that reason, DJ may be lower than 2RS.
Second, for the same level of total retention, the premium is lower for joint insurance than
for separate insurance. This reduces the marginal cost of accommodation for a given level
of total deductible and makes a higher deductible optimal. Whether DJ is higher or lower
than 2RS depends on whether the second or ﬁrst eﬀect dominates.
Continuous losses. The optimality of a joint deductible carries forward to the case of
continuous losses. I show that a deductible is optimal in the single risk case. The optimality
of a deductible on the aggregate risk then follows directly from the discussion above.
I assume that the loss x is a random variable with x ∈ [x,x]. A loss still occurs with
probability p and, conditional on a loss, the distribution of x is g(x). I(x) is the total amount
that the ﬁrm receives from an insurer in the case of a loss of x,a n dR(x)=x − I(x) is the
ﬁrm’s retention. In analogy to the discrete case, I assume that 0 ≤ R(x) and 0 ≤ R0(x) ≤ 1
8for all x ∈ [x,x] to assure that the ﬁrm has no incentives to hide or fraudulently cause losses.
For ease of exposition, I denote R(x) by Rx.
The ﬁrm’s objective is to minimize the total frictional cost of risk, αE[L−RL]+γ(P+R¯ x)
where R¯ x is the maximum retention since R0(x) ≥ 0. The optimal insurance contract implies
Rx =m i n {x,R¯ x} for all x ∈ [x,x]. Assume Rx < min{x,R¯ x}, then the insurance premium
can be reduced by increasing Rx to min{x,R¯ x}. This reduces the loading and the frictional
cost of accommodation. The retention structure can be implemented through an insurance
contract with a deductible D so that Rx =m i n {x,D}.
Accommodation versus uncovered losses (risk aversion). Although, with propor-
tional loading, a joint deductible is optimal for both risk management motives, the reasons
diﬀer. In the case of accommodation, the beneﬁt of a joint deductible stems from a more
eﬃcient use of a given level of capital (that is increasing in P + R2). In the case of uncov-
ered losses (risk aversion), the beneﬁts t e m sf r o mt h ec o n v e xc o s to fr a i s i n gc a p i t a l( c o n c a v e
utility), which makes it optimal to choose a retention structure where the marginal cost
of raising the necessary capital to cover the retention ex post is equal to the proportional
loading factor α in all states. Thus, R1 = R2 unless the constraint R1 ≤ x is binding: given
the convex cost of uncovered losses (concave utility), it is optimal to reduce the volatility of
the retention; i.e., it is optimal to reduce the diﬀerence between R2 and R1.T h i si sa c h i e v e d
through a joint deductible.
The diﬀerent rationale for a joint deductible in both cases can also be observed when
considering the eﬀect of joint insurance coverage on the total level of risk that the ﬁrm
optimally retains. In the case of uncovered losses (risk aversion), the ﬁrm’s total retention
with joint insurance is always lower than with separate insurance. The reason is that the
expected marginal costs of capital (expected utilities) diﬀer for joint and separate insur-
ance. The deductible in the one-loss case is lower with separate insurance. Therefore, the
expected marginal frictional cost of the uncovered retention (marginal utility) is also lower,
which, given proportional loading, increases the optimal level of the deductible for each risk,
9resulting in a higher total retention.
4 Improving the Trade-Oﬀ Between Risk Transfer and
Incentives
In this section I analyze the eﬀect of moral hazard on the optimal retention structure with
joint insurance. Therefore, I drop again the assumption that the ﬁrm can commit to loss
control. To focus on the incentive problem and, in particular, on the interaction between the
optimal incentive-compatible retention and the cost of accommodating risk, I assume zero
loading (α =0 ). Thus, without the incentive problem, it would be optimal for the ﬁrm to
fully insure both risks. Because of the incentive problem, the ﬁrm may ﬁnd it optimal to
retain some risk, and its objective is to choose the retention structure that minimizes the
frictional cost of accommodating losses subject to the ﬁrm’s incentive constraints. With zero
loading, (1) is equivalent to minimizing P +R2.T h eﬁrm’s optimization problem is given by
min
R1,R2
P + R2 (2)
subject to
p
2
lR2 +2 pl(1 − pl)R1 +2 c ≤ phplR2 +( ph(1 − pl)+pl(1 − ph))R1 + c (IC1)
p
2
lR2 +2 pl(1 − pl)R1 +2 c ≤ p
2
hR2 +2 ph(1 − ph)R1 (IC2)
P = E[L] − p
2
lR2 − 2(1 − pl)plR1
The ﬁrm’s incentive constraints are given by (IC1) and (IC2). (IC1) assures that the ﬁrm
does not shirk on one of the risks and (IC2) assures that the ﬁrm does not shirk on both
risks. Because of symmetry, it is not necessary to distinguish between the two individual
risks; (IC1) captures both risks in the sense that if the ﬁrm has an incentive to shirk on
(exactly) one risk, it is indiﬀerent between the two, and if it has no incentive to shirk only
on risk i, it has no incentive to shirk only on j 6= i. The frictional cost of capital does
not enter the incentive constraints because, for a given level of capital, the frictional cost of
accommodating risk is given and not aﬀected by the loss realization.
10Separate insurance. With separate insurance, R2 =2 R1. Substituting P and R2 =2 R1
into the optimization problem (2) and rearranging terms yields
min
R1
E[L]+2 ( 1− pl)R1 (3)
subject to
plR1 + c ≤ phR1. (ICS)
Because of symmetry, the incentive-compatible retention structures for both risks are
identical, and (IC1) and (IC2) converge to (ICS). It directly follows that it is optimal for
the ﬁrm to minimize R1 subject to the incentive constraint. Thus, the incentive constraint
is binding and the optimal retention is
R
∗ =
c
ph − pl
. (4)
Joint insurance. With a single policy, R1 and R2 are chosen individually to minimize
P + R2 subject to (IC1) and (IC2):
c ≤ (phpl − p
2
l)R2 +( ph − pl)(1 − 2pl)R1 (IC1)
c ≤ 0.5(p
2
h − p
2
l)R2 +( ph − pl)(1 − ph − pl)R1. (IC2)
Absent the incentive constraints, full insurance is optimal for the ﬁrm so that the incentive
constraints place a lower bound on the retention. I proceed in two steps. First, I analyze
the structure of the incentive-compatible insurance contract that minimizes R2.S e c o n d ,I
derive the optimal incentive-compatible retention that minimizes P + R2.
Lemma 1 The incentive-compatible joint contract that minimizes R2 is characterized by:
(a) A common aggregate deductible if ph + pl < 1.
(b) A common aggregate policy limit if pl > 0.5.
(c) The same retention structure as separate insurance if ph + pl ≥ 1 and pl < 0.5.
In case (a) the probability of incurring exactly one loss is higher if the ﬁrm shirks, and
chooses either one or no investment in loss prevention, than if it invests in loss prevention for
11both risks. Therefore, participating in L = x has a positive incentive eﬀect. Increasing R1
allows to reduce R2. Minimizing R2 implies that R1 =m i n {x,R2} and that (IC2) is binding.
In contrast, the probability of incurring exactly one loss is higher if the ﬁrm does not shirk
in case (b). As a consequence, the incentive eﬀect of participating in L = x is negative and
it is optimal to reduce the retained risk in this state to zero. This allows to reduce R2.I n
case (c) the joint retention structure resembles the one with separate insurance and it is not
possible to reduce R2.
Substituting P = p2
l(2x − R2)+2 pl(1 − pl)(x − R1) into the objective function and
rearranging terms yields
min
R1,R2
E[L] − 2pl(1 − pl)R1 +( 1− p
2
l)R2. (5)
Thus, the incentive-compatible retention that minimizes R2 may not coincide with the in-
centive compatible retention that minimizes P + R2.
While P + R2 increases in R2, it decreases in R1.T h u s ,t h eo v e r a l le ﬀect in (b), which
requires to reduce R1 in order to reduce R2, is unclear. Indeed, it may be optimal to increase
R1 (compared to separate insurance) even if incentive compatibility requires to also increase
R2. The same would then also be true in (c).
Proposition 2 (i) The incentive-compatible contract that minimizes P + R2 is a contract
with a joint deductible on aggregate losses. (ii) The optimal joint deductible is lower (higher)
than the total retention with separate insurance if ph + pl < 1 (ph + pl ≥ 1).
The optimality of a contract with a joint deductible is straightforward in case (a), where
it stems from higher incentives, which allows to reduce R2. In cases (b) and (c), the beneﬁt
of a deductible contract stems from a reduction in the insurance premium. While increasing
R1 requires to also increase R2 to assure incentive compatibility, the increase in R2 is over-
compensated by the reduction of the premium. Again, the advantage of multiline insurance
stems from reducing the diﬀerence between R2 and R1 and the reduction in the insurance
premium.
12Part (ii) directly follows from (i) and the discussion above. If ph + pl < 1,i n c r e a s i n gR1
to R1 =m i n {L,R2} allows to reduce R2 and therefore the joint deductible. If ph + pl ≥ 1,
increasing R1 to R1 =m i n {L,R2} (which is optimal as stated in part (i)) requires to also
increase R2.
One loss prevention program for both risks. The discussion carries forward to the
case where one eﬀort aﬀects both probabilities. That is, the ﬁrm can choose pi = pj = ph at
zero costs or pi = pj = pl at costs ˆ c =2 c. The analysis is similar to the one with two separate
eﬀort choices for the two risks and Proposition 3 continues to hold. The only diﬀerence is
that (IC2) is now the only incentive constraint. (IC1) is no longer relevant since the choice
pi = ph and pj = pl is no longer an option.
Continuous losses and pure loss avoidance. The loss x is a random variable with
x ∈ [x,x]. As Holmstrom (1979), I assume that the loss occurs with probability pi ∈ {pl,p h}
and, conditional on a loss, the distribution of x is g(x). Therefore, loss control only aﬀects
the probability of a loss, but not the conditional distribution. In this case, only the expected
retention in the case of a loss matters for incentives. Since the ﬁr mh a st oh o l de q u i t yt oc o v e r
the maximum retained loss and premium, it is optimal to choose a contract with a deductible.
Thus, for the case considered by Holmstrom (1979), the discussion above directly implies
that it is optimal to choose an insurance contract that covers both risks with a deductible
on the aggregate loss if the ﬁrm’s objective is to minimize the cost of accommodation. In
contrast, as shown by Breuer (2005), a deductible on aggregate losses is not optimal if the
risk management motive stems from risk aversion.
5C o n c l u s i o n
Ic o n s i d e raﬁrm that wants to accommodate losses by holding equity. Equity is associated
with frictional costs of raising and holding it. One way to reduce the required equity is
to transfer potential losses through insurance. Because of transaction costs of risk transfer
13or moral hazard problems, it may not be optimal to completely transfer potential losses.
Therefore, the ﬁrm has to decide on the optimal retention structure when transferring risks.
In the case of frictional costs of risk transfer, it is optimal to choose a contract with a
joint deductible on aggregate losses: e.g., a multiline insurance policy with a deductible on
aggregate losses. In the setting considered in this paper, this contract is also optimal if the
reason for retaining risk stems from moral hazard.
I assumed that the ﬁrm chooses the level of loss control and then losses are realized (or
not). That is, there is no interim moral hazard problem where the ﬁrm can adjust the level
of care in response to observing interim loss realizations. With interim moral hazard there
is a cost of a joint deductible: if the ﬁrm realizes a loss that exceeds the deductible, it has
no longer an incentive to bear the cost of reducing the loss probability on its other risks
that are covered by the same policy. To what extent interim moral hazard is a potential
problem depends on the type of loss control. The interim moral hazard problem is low if
the level of loss control is diﬃcult to change (e.g., organizational procedures that reduce the
loss probability) or if losses are realized long after the investment in loss control (e.g., care
in product design).
6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. (i) The ﬁrst part directly follows from the discussion after
Proposition 1.
(ii) Since there is no commitment problem, I drop the index from the loss probability;
each loss occurs with probability p. Substituting E[R2]=p2R2 +2 ( 1− p)pR1 in (1), yields
αE[L] − α(p2R2 +2 ( 1− p)pR1)+γ((1 + α)(E[L] − (p2R2 +2 ( 1− p)pR1)) + R2).
With separate insurance, the optimal retention RS minimizes αE[L] − 2αpRS + γ((1 +
α)(E[L] −2pRS)+2RS). Therefore RS is given by the ﬁrst order condition −2αp+γ0((1 +
α)(E[L]−2pRS)+2RS)(−(1+α)2p+2)=0. Rearranging terms yields αp/(1−(1+α)p)=
γ0((1 + α)E[L]+( 1− (1 + α)p)2RS).
14With joint insurance, the deductible minimizes αE[L]−α(p2DJ+2(1−p)pmin{DJ,x})+
γ((1 + α)(E[L] − (p2DJ +2 ( 1− p)pmin{DJ,x})) + DJ).
For DJ <x ,the ﬁrst order condition for the optimal DJ is −α(2−p)p+γ0((1+α)(E[L]−
(2 − p)pDJ)+DJ)(1 − (1 + α)(2 − p)p)=0 . Rearranging terms yields α(2 − p)p/(1 − (1 +
α)(2p − p2)) = γ0((1 + α)(E[L] − (2 − p)pDJ)+DJ).
The left-hand side of the ﬁrst order condition with separate insurance is lower than
the left-hand side of the ﬁrst order condition with joint insurance: αp/(1 − (1 + α)p) <
α(2−p)p/(1−(1+α)(2p−p2)). Rearranging terms yields 1 < (2−p). Moreover, 1−(1+α)p>
1 − (1 + α)(2 − p)p since p<1. Since the cost of accommodation are convex, 2RS <D J.
For DJ >x ,the ﬁrst order condition for the optimal DJ is −αp2 + γ0((1 + α)(E[L] −
(p2DJ+2(1−p)px))+DJ)(1−(1+α)p2)=0 . Rearranging terms yields αp2/(1−(1+α)p2)=
γ0((1 + α)(E[L] − (p2DJ +2 ( 1− p)px)) + DJ).
The left-hand side of the ﬁrst order condition with separate insurance is higher than
the left-hand side of the ﬁrst order condition with joint insurance: αp/(1 − (1 + α)p) >
αp2/(1 − (1 + α)p2). Rearranging terms yields 1 >p .M o r e o v e r , (1 − (1 + α)p)2RS >
DJ − (1 + α)(p2DJ +2 ( 1− p)px)) for 2RS = DJ > 2x. Substituting 2RS = DJ in the
inequality and rearranging terms yields DJ > 2x.T h e r e f o r e , 2RS m a yb eh i g h e ro rl o w e r
than DJ. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 . (a) ph + pl < 1 implies that (ph − pl)(1 − ph − pl) > 0. Moreover,
(ph−pl)(1−2pl) > 0 when pl < 0.5, which is satisﬁed for ph+pl < 1. Therefore, both terms
are positive and increasing R1 allows to reduce R2 without violating the incentive constraint.
Minimizing R2, implies R1 =m i n {x,R2} subject to (IC1) and (IC2). It is straightforward to
check that (IC2) is the binding constraint. The contract can be implemented with a common
deductible DJ with R2 = DJ and R1 =m i n {x,DJ}.
(b) pl > 0.5 implies ph + pl > 1 and therefore, (ph − pl)(1 − 2pl) < 0 and (ph − pl)(1 −
ph − pl) < 0. Now, it is possible to reduce R2 without violating the incentive constraints
by simultaneously decreasing R1. Minimizing R2 implies R1 =0and only (IC1) is binding;
15R2 = c/[pl(ph−pl)].I fc/[pl(ph−pl)] >x ,i.e., R2−R1 >x ,t h eﬁr mw o u l dh a v ea ni n c e n t i v e
to hide the second loss. To assure honest reporting, R2 = R1 + x and R1 is chosen so that
(IC1) is binding. The retention structure can be implemented through a common aggregate
policy limit IJ with R2 =2 x − IJ and R1 =m a x {0,x− IJ}.
(c) If ph+pl ≥ 1 and 0.5 ≤ pl, it is not possible to relax both constraints by changing R1
a n di ti st h e r e f o r en o tp o s s i b l et or e d u c eR2 without violating at least one of the incentive
constraints. Hence, R∗
2 =2 R∗
1 =2 c/[ph − pl] is optimal. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2. (i) To derive the optimal retention structure, it is important to
know which incentive constraint is binding. For the optimal separate contract, R2 =2 R1
and (IC1) and (IC2) are both binding. When, starting from the retention structure in the
optimal separating contracts, R1 and R2 are changed in a joint contract, only (IC2) is binding
if dR2 < 2dR1 and therefore R2 < 2R1. In contrast, only (IC1) is binding if dR2 > 2dR1
and R2 > 2R1.
If (IC2) is binding, then R2 is given by
R2 =
2c
(p2
h − p2
l)
−
2(1 − ph − pl)
(ph + pl)
R1 (A1)
and ∂R2
∂R1 = −
2(1−ph−pl)
(ph+pl) < 2, which implies that dR2 < 2dR1 if dR1 > 0 and dR2 > 2dR1 if
dR1 < 0.
If (IC1) binding, then R2 is given by
R2 =
c
(phpl − p2
l)
−
(1 − 2pl)
pl
R1 (A2)
with
∂R2
∂R1 = −
(1−2pl)
pl < 2.A g a i n ,dR2 < 2dR1 if dR1 > 0 and dR2 > 2dR1 if dR1 < 0.
Therefore, (IC2) is binding if it is optimal to increase R1 starting from the optimal
separate contract while (IC1) is binding if it is optimal to decrease R1.
I ﬁrst check, whether it is optimal to reduce R1. In this case, (IC1) is binding and the
objective function is given by E[L]−2pl(1−pl)R1 +(1−p2
l)[ c
(phpl−p2
l ) −
(1−2pl)
pl R1].T h eﬁrst
order condition for the optimal R1 is −2pl(1 − pl) − (1 − p2
l)
(1−2pl)
pl , which is negative since
16pl < 1. Thus, it would be optimal to increase R1. However, in this case (IC2) is the relevant
constraint.
I now assume that (IC2) is binding and substitute (A1) in the objective function to
obtain E[L] − 2pl(1 − pl)R1 +( 1− p2
l)[ 2c
(p2
h−p2
l ) −
2(1−ph−pl)
(ph+pl) R1].T h eﬁrst order condition for
the optimal R1 is −2pl(1 − pl) − (1 − p2
l)[
2(1−ph−pl)
(ph+pl) ] < 0 since ph < 1. Thus, it is optimal to
increase R1 and to set R1 =m i n {x,R2}.
(ii) The second part of the proposition directly follows from (i) and the discussion in the
main text.
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